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October 16, 2019 
 
The Uncopyrightability of Edicts of Government  
 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh,* and Peter S. Menell 
 
This amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court appeal of Georgia, et al., v. 
Public.Resource.Org.,explores the interplay of copyright law and the edicts of government 
doctrine.  The “edicts of government” doctrine was first validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
a series of nineteenth century cases. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Banks v. 
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While the doctrine 
has never been directly recognized in the express wording of the copyright statute, it is 
nevertheless firmly rooted in foundational copyright principles that are themselves reflected in 
the text of the statute. 
Three foundational copyright principles buttress the doctrine. First, copyrightable 
authorship does not extend to official announcements of law, the hallmark of edicts of 
government. Authorship as requires personalization, an attribute that is antithetical to official 
pronouncements of law, which are generated in an impersonal and ex officio manner. Second, all 
edicts of government, as legal texts, are methods of operation, rendering them uncopyrightable. 
Third, authentic statements of law entail the merger of idea and expression insofar as the 
expression underlying edicts of government are capable of being expressed in only a limited 
number of ways in order to preserve its authenticity. 
Consequently, the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) is not copyrightable. Petitioners 
concede that the statutory content of the O.C.G.A. is uncopyrightable. The annotations 
incorporated into the O.C.G.A. by the state legislature bear the imprimatur of the state and are 
therefore produced under the ostensible authority of the state, which renders them an edict of 
government. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, an edict does not need to have the force of law to 
qualify as an uncopyrightable edict of government. The Supreme Court’s precedents contradict 
this position. Instead, faithful reading of these precedents suggest that something becomes an 
uncopyrightable edict of government when it is produced under the ostensible authority of the 
state and thus receives a presumptively official status, owing to its endorsement by the state. The 
process by which the annotations contained in the O.C.G.A. are adopted and merged with the 
statutory content therein constitutes the exercise of such ostensible authority, rendering the 
O.C.G.A. an uncopyrightable edict of government.   
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 The authors of this brief are law professors at the 
University of Pennsylvania and the University of Cal-
ifornia who study and teach intellectual property law. 
Their research explores the interaction between statu-
tory law and judge-made law in the evolution of U.S. 
copyright law. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The “edicts of government” doctrine was first vali-
dated by this Court in a series of nineteenth century 
cases. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); 
Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Callaghan v. 
Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). While the doctrine has 
never been directly recognized in the express wording 
of the copyright statute, it is nevertheless firmly rooted 
in foundational copyright principles that are them-
selves reflected in the text of the statute. 
 Three foundational copyright principles buttress 
the doctrine. First, copyrightable authorship does not 
extend to official announcements of law, the hallmark 
of edicts of government. Authorship as understood in 
this Court’s jurisprudence requires personalization, an 
 
 1 Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, amici note that no counsel 
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel 
or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prep-
aration or submission of this brief. No person other than amici 
curiae made a monetary contribution to its preparation or sub-
mission. Petitioner and Respondents have consented to the filing 
of this brief. 
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attribute that is antithetical to official pronounce-
ments of law, which are generated in an impersonal 
and ex officio manner. Second, all edicts of government, 
as legal texts, are methods of operation, rendering 
them uncopyrightable. Third, authentic statements 
of law entail the merger of idea and expression insofar 
as the expression underlying edicts of government are 
capable of being expressed in only a limited number of 
ways in order to preserve its authenticity. 
 Consequently, the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) 
is not copyrightable. Petitioners concede that the stat-
utory content of the O.C.G.A. is uncopyrightable. Pet. 
Br. at 20. The annotations incorporated into the 
O.C.G.A. by the state legislature bear the imprimatur 
of the state and are therefore produced under the os-
tensible authority of the state, which renders them an 
edict of government. 
 Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, an edict does 
not need to have the force of law to qualify as an un-
copyrightable edict of government. This Court’s own 
precedents contradict this position. Instead, faithful 
reading of these precedents suggest that something be-
comes an uncopyrightable edict of government when it 
is produced under the ostensible authority of the state 
and thus receives a presumptively official status, ow-
ing to its endorsement by the state. The process by 
which the annotations contained in the O.C.G.A. are 
adopted and merged with the statutory content therein 
constitutes the exercise of such ostensible authority, 
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rendering the O.C.G.A. an uncopyrightable edict of 
government. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE “EDICTS OF GOVERNMENT” DOC-
TRINE IS FIRMLY ROOTED IN FUNDA-
MENTAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES 
 The edicts of government doctrine, which denies 
copyright protection to all official expositions of law, re-
mains a well-established rule of copyright law affirmed 
by this Court’s jurisprudence. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 
U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128 
U.S. 244, 253-54 (1888); Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 
617, 646-50 (1888). While the doctrine conforms to 
longstanding “public policy,” Banks, 128 U.S. at 253, its 
roots lie in three fundamental copyright principles re-
flected in the copyright statute. Contrary to what Peti-
tioners imply, Pet. Br. 21-24, the edicts of government 
doctrine are therefore fully consistent with the text of 
the copyright statute. Indeed, it is demanded by copy-
right law principles. 
 
A. The Official Announcement of Law Is Not 
Copyrightable Authorship 
 Copyright protection subsists in “original works of 
authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Copyright’s require-
ment of authorship derives from the text of the Consti-
tution, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8, a reality that this 
Court has long recognized. Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
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Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56-58 (1884). All the same, 
the text of the copyright statute has never defined the 
terms “author” or “authorship,” leaving it to courts to 
construe the term consistent with the Constitution and 
the Copyright Act. 
 This Court has understood the “author” in copy-
right as the actor to whom a work “owes its existence” 
and as the “effective cause” of the work. Burrow-Giles, 
111 U.S. at 61. Authorship thus entails a causal rela-
tionship between the actor and the work. Additionally, 
authorship has been understood to entail the “personal 
imprint” of an actor upon the work. Bleistein v. Don-
aldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
Personalization is therefore an essential component of 
copyright authorship. This personalization implies 
that the personal identity of the actor responsible for 
original expression is a critical consideration in treat-
ing it as a work of authorship. It is for this reason that 
original expression, however creative when fixed in a 
tangible medium, but nevertheless without an identi-
fiable individual as the cause for its production, is in-
eligible for copyright protection as lacking authorship. 
See, e.g., Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, 114 F. 3d 
955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 By contrast, the official announcement of laws—
otherwise referred to as the act of “promulgation”—is 
an action performed ex officio. The personal, as opposed 
to official, identity of the agent undertaking the action 
is irrelevant to the formal status and validity of the 
announcement as law. When a legislative body enacts 
a law, the identities of the individual legislators 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477564 
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responsible for its passage do not matter. Their per-
sonal identities are subsumed under their official role 
as validly elected legislators entitled to vote on the 
passage of the legislation. So it is with the exposition 
of law in judicial opinions, where the personal identity 
of the judge is irrelevant to the status and validity of 
the opinion. The work emanates from the judiciary as 
the product of constitutional and legislative authority. 
The promulgation of law is therefore a fundamentally 
impersonal action that is at odds with the idea of cop-
yright authorship. This remains true of both promul-
gation by statutes and regulations as well as the 
exposition of the laws in judicial opinions. 
 It is this basic disconnect between the impersonal 
act of promulgation and the personal nature of author-
ship that formed the principal basis of the Court’s opin-
ion in Banks: “[i]n no proper sense can the judge who, 
in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or deci-
sion, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head 
note, be regarded as their author.” Banks, 128 U.S. at 
253 (emphasis supplied). The reference to “judicial ca-
pacity” is crucial here, since in it lies the fundamental 
distinction. When acting in an official judicial capacity, 
the judge’s personal identity is rendered irrelevant 
since the judge is speaking as a member of the court, 
thereby precluding a valid claim of copyrightable au-
thorship. Conversely, when those very portions of a 
case report are prepared by an individual not acting in 
a formal judicial capacity and therefore not speaking 
for the court, i.e., the court reporter, they become fully 
eligible for copyright protection provided they meet 
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copyright’s other eligibility criteria. Callaghan, 128 
U.S. at 650. 
 
B. Legal Texts Are Methods of Operation 
that Constrain Expressive Choice and 
Are Ineligible for Copyright 
 Methods of operation are ineligible for copyright 
protection under the terms of the copyright statute. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright pro-
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
. . . method of operation . . . , regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work.”). This rule reflects copyright law’s 
exclusion of functional expression, explained by the 
Court in Baker v. Selden. 101 U.S. 99 (1880). According 
to the rule and principles explained therein and since 
codified in the statute, a method of operation refers to 
the “means by which a person operates something.” Lo-
tus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F. 3d 807, 815 
(1st Cir. 1995). In other words, it refers to the func-
tional aspect of text that is directed at realizing an 
identifiable result. 
 In Lotus v. Borland, the First Circuit concluded 
that the plaintiff ’s “command menu hierarchy” was an 
uncopyrightable method of operation insofar as it did 
“not merely explain and present” the functionality but 
instead represented the very “method by which” that 
functionality was realized. Id. at 815-16. Even though 
the hierarchy embodied “some expressive choices,” the 
court concluded that those choices were subsumed in 
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its overall functionality, thereby rendering it ineligible 
for copyright. Id. at 816. That case illustrates how the 
functionality underlying a method of operation may 
constrain the choice of expression, rendering such ex-
pression unprotectable. The case determined that the 
method of operation constrained the plaintiff ’s choice 
of expression, rendering it additionally uncopyrighta-
ble. Id. at 816 (“The ‘expressive’ choices of what to 
name the command terms and how to arrange them do 
not magically change the uncopyrightable menu com-
mand hierarchy into copyrightable subject matter.”). 
Similar considerations can pertain to situations where 
“external factors” influence and dictate an actor’s 
range of expression. See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc., 982 F. 2d 693, 710-11 (2d Cir. 1992); Sega 
Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510, 1522 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (“functional requirements for compatibility 
. . . are not protected by copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)”). 
 Legal texts are methods of operation, much like an 
instruction manual. They attempt to bring about par-
ticular results by controlling the behavior of citizens 
through the obligatory nature of the law. And, unlike 
ordinary text that has few external constraints, legal 
text dictates how citizens (and other relevant actors—
e.g., government officials or courts) understand partic-
ular language and modify their behavior accordingly. 
The choice of specific terms in a legal text and their 
arrangement represent choices motivated entirely by 
the functional purpose behind the law. 
 As an illustration, consider the text of a provision 
in the Copyright Act dealing with attorney’s fees: 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477564 
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“Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court 
may also award a reasonable attorney’s fees to the pre-
vailing party as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. The 
text of this provision contains expression. Yet, its ver-
biage and structure are dictated entirely by the result 
that it seeks to communicate, defining a court’s discre-
tion in awarding attorney’s fees. The first part of the 
sentence renders the provision subject to the rest of 
the statute, and its use of the term “may” (instead of 
“shall”) confirms a court’s discretion in making awards. 
To be sure, each of the provision’s terms and phrases 
has English language synonyms, but as choices made 
in creating a legal directive they reflect the constraints 
of external purpose—communicating the grant of this 
power to courts—rather than any literary flourish. 
Those circumstances render such expression ineligible 
for copyright. 
 This Court in Banks recognized both the func-
tional nature of the expression at issue as well as the 
constraint on expressive choices that it produced. As 
the opinion captured the matter, “[t]he whole work 
done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition 
and interpretation of the law, which, binding every cit-
izen, is free for publication to all.” Banks, 128 U.S. at 
253-54 (emphasis supplied). Petitioners misinterpret 
the reference to “binding” to mean that a legal text 
must have the “force of law” to qualify as a government 
edict. See infra pp. 12-18. The reference to the law 
“binding every citizen” is instead a recognition of the 
innately functional nature of government edicts, re-
gardless of their precise source. The judge’s work in 
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ensuring the “authentic exposition” of the law in turn 
implies a constraint—on form and verbiage—that ac-
companies the production of government edicts, ren-
dering them ineligible for copyright protection. 
 
C. Authentic Statements of Law Entail the 
Merger of Idea and Expression 
 As a related matter, the “authentic[ity]” in “expo-
sition” of the law accompanying a government edict en-
tails the merger of expression and idea, rendering it 
further ineligible for copyright protection. A natural 
corollary to copyright’s rule disfavoring protection for 
functional expression, the merger doctrine denies pro-
tection “when the uncopyrightable subject matter is 
very narrow, so that ‘the topic necessarily requires,’ . . . 
if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited 
number.” Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Company, 379 
F. 2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). “When the ‘idea’ and 
its ‘expression’ are thus inseparable, copying the ‘ex-
pression’ will not be barred.” Herbert Rosenthal Jew-
elry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
 Government edicts purport to be authentic pro-
nouncements of law, whether they be judicial opinions, 
legislative statutes, or administrative regulations. Ju-
dicial opinions expounding or interpreting “the law” 
choose expression that reflect the judge’s understand-
ing of the law, be it statutory or common law. Statutes 
and regulations, in turn, declare “the law” in their 
very text. This commitment to authenticity severely 
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circumscribes the value in any expressive variation 
that might be introduced in subsequent expositions of 
the law. Any restatement of the law using expression 
that is different from the words used in the govern-
ment edict risks undermining its meaning and authen-
ticity as a binding statement of law. 
 Consider another section of the Copyright Act: “No 
civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of 
this title unless it is commenced within three years af-
ter the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507. A creative and 
perhaps more efficient restatement of this provision 
reads: “A maintainable civil action under this title 
must be commenced within three years from the ac-
crual of the claim.” To most people reading the restate-
ment, it may well communicate the same meaning as 
the actual statutory text. Nonetheless, the restatement 
is no longer an authentic statement of the law. By al-
tering the wording and structure of the original provi-
sion, it introduces new terminology and therefore 
abandons its authenticity as an authoritative state-
ment of the law. It thereupon loses its formal status as 
such. This Court is intimately familiar with the im-
portance of statutory and jurisprudential wording to 
the explication of law. 
 It is this analytic dimension that the merger doc-
trine captures in relation to government edicts. An 
edict’s commitment to authenticity in exposition, a pre-
requisite for its binding nature as “law,” necessitates 
verbatim wording, implying that the “law” contained in 
the edict is only ever capable of expression in one or a 
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limited number of ways, effectively merging the law 
and its exposition. 
* * * 
 Consequently, the government edicts doctrine 
finds support in fundamental copyright doctrines. 
Copyright’s authorship, functionality, and merger col-
lectively buttress the government edicts doctrine by 
rendering edicts of government uncopyrightable. 
 
II. THE OFFICIAL CODE OF GEORGIA ANNO-
TATED (O.C.G.A.) IS AN UNCOPYRIGHTA-
BLE EDICT OF GOVERNMENT 
 The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is pub-
lished by the State of Georgia and is the only compila-
tion of the state’s official statutory code that is publicly 
available. It consists of the state code enacted by the 
legislature along with annotations prepared by the 
publisher, both of which are merged into a common vol-
ume. O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1. The annotations comprise “such 
materials as summaries of judicial decisions interpret-
ing or applying particular statutes.” Pet. Br. at 2. 
 Petitioners concede that the statute itself is un-
copyrightable as an edict of government. Id. at 2-3. At 
issue is the copyrightability of the annotations. While 
created by a private party under direction from the 
state, the annotations do not have the force of law 
as such. See O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7. They are nevertheless 
adopted through a formal vote of the state legislature, 
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merged with the statute, and collectively published “by 
authority of the state.” O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1. 
 Although the annotations do not have the force of 
law and are therefore not binding as such, they none-
theless fall within the edicts of government doctrine. 
They are prepared under the direction of the legisla-
ture, and their adoption and merger into the enacted 
statute reveals that they are created under the osten-
sible authority of the state, making them uncopyright-
able edicts of government. 
 
A. An Edict of Government Does Not Need 
to Have the Force of Law 
 Without any basis in precedent or the statute, Pe-
titioners contend that in order to qualify as an edict of 
government under the doctrine as developed by this 
Court, the edict must have the “force of law.” Pet. Br. at 
32. As Respondent rightly notes, this argument flies in 
the face of the very precedent upon which Petitioners 
rely and introduces an artificial constraint into the 
working of the doctrine, leading to absurd results. 
Resp. Br. at 40. 
 While Petitionesr rightly note that the Court’s 
opinion in Wheaton has been understood as recogniz-
ing that the annotations at issue in the case were 
copyrightable, it mistakenly concludes that this was 
because those annotations lacked binding effect. Pet. 
Br. at 33. As Respondent correctly argues in its account 
of the history surrounding Wheaton and the parties’ 
positions therein, the reason had to do with the 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477564 
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manner in which those notes and annotations were 
prepared in the case. Insofar as they were not prepared 
by the judges themselves but instead independently 
by the court reporter, they were seen as the legitimate 
result of the reporter’s own creative effort, despite 
lacking any binding effect as law. Resp. Br. at 24-26. 
 Indeed, this understanding informed this Court’s 
twin opinions in Banks and Callaghan, authored by 
the same justice within the same month. In the latter 
of the two cases, Justice Samuel Blatchford’s opinion 
allowed the court reporter to assert a copyright claim 
in parts of the report that went beyond the “opinions of 
the judges”. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647. That case read 
Wheaton and its subsequent remand to stand for the 
proposition that the elements of the reports “not em-
bracing the written opinions of the court, namely, the 
title-page, table of cases, head-notes, statements of 
facts, arguments of counsel, and index . . . may be the 
lawful subject of copyright.” Id. at 649. Yet some weeks 
earlier, Justice Blatchford’s opinion denied the copy-
rightability of not just the judicial opinions them-
selves, but also the statements of cases, syllabi, and 
headnotes. Banks, 128 U.S. at 253. The reasoning was 
simple: Unlike in Callaghan, the statements of cases, 
syllabi, and headnotes that went into the reports in 
Banks were prepared by the judges themselves rather 
than by the court reporter. Id. at 251. 
 Banks underlines this point through its repeated 
emphasis on the work actually performed by a judge. 
This Court considered the point obvious when it 
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emphasized that “[in] no proper sense can the judge 
who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or 
decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or 
head note, be regarded as their author or their propri-
etor.” Id. at 253. The work of a judge was the key deter-
minant. 
Judges . . . can themselves have no pecuniary 
interest or proprietorship, as against the 
public at large, in the fruits of their judicial 
labors. This extends to whatever work they per-
form in their capacity as judges, and as well to 
the statements of cases and head notes pre-
pared by them as such, as to the opinions and 
decisions themselves. 
Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 Banks specifies that, in its answer to plaintiff ’s 
bill, the defendant elaborated on the role of the court 
reporter in the state of Ohio at the time. The answer 
averred that the opinions constituting the reports 
were exclusively the work of the judges com-
posing those courts; that the reporter per-
formed no work in preparing the said opinions 
and decisions; that it is the universal custom 
and practice of those courts that the judge to 
whom the duty is assigned of preparing the 
opinion, prepares not only the opinion but also 
the statement of the case and the syllabus, the 
latter being subject to revision by the judges 
concurring in the opinion; that the reporter 
takes no part, and performs no labor, in pre-
paring the syllabus, the statement of the case 
and the opinion. 
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Id. at 250. Banks based its decision on the uncopyright-
ability of the opinions in principal part on these facts, 
which have all to do with the judicial origins of the un-
copyrightable elements and nothing whatsoever to do 
with their binding nature. See id. at 251. 
 Petitioners base its argument on the sole use of 
the phrase “binding every citizen” used by Banks in 
conjunction with “the authentic exposition and inter-
pretation of the law.” Id. at 253; Pet. Br. at 40. By 
cherry-picking this phrase and using it out of context, 
Petitioner ignores its origins altogether. As the opinion 
in Banks makes clear through citation, this phrase 
originates in the Massachusetts case of Nash v. Lath-
rop, 6 N.E. 559 (Mass. 1886), decided two years before 
Banks and Callaghan. 
 While Nash raised questions about the copyright-
ability of judicial opinions and the scope of such copy-
right, the court chose to decide the case on “a narrower 
question” of interpreting the contract between the 
state and the publisher to see if that contract had con-
ferred upon the publisher the right to prevent others 
from making the opinions public until they were first 
published by them. Nash, 6 N.E. at 560. And to inform 
its analysis, Nash observed: 
The decisions and opinions of the justices are 
the authorized expositions and interpreta-
tions of the laws, which are binding upon all 
the citizens. They declare the unwritten law, 
and construe and declare the meaning of the 
statutes. Every citizen is presumed to know 
the law thus declared, and it needs no 
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argument to show that justice requires that 
all should have free access to the opinions, 
and that it is against sound public policy to 
prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the 
earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, 
or the decisions and opinions of the justices. 
. . . It can hardly be contended that it would 
be within the constitutional power of the leg-
islature to enact that the statutes and opin-
ions should not be made known to the public. 
Id. 
 The reference to “binding” was therefore an expla-
nation for the court’s conclusion that the legislature 
had an obligation to publicize its laws, both judge-
made and statutory. Indeed, Justice Blatchford uses it 
as such in Banks, since it follows on the heels of his 
reference to “public policy,” which was precisely the 
basis for the court’s non-copyright decision in Nash. 
Banks, 128 U.S. at 253. Petitioners miss this lineage 
altogether in its simplistic attempt to bootstrap the 
idea of “binding law” into the edicts of government doc-
trine. 
 Appreciating this nuance is critical to understand-
ing Justice Blatchford’s opinions in Banks and Calla-
ghan, since he was acutely aware of the role that court 
reporters played in the preparation of case reports. 
Justice Blatchford himself served as a court reporter 
to the courts in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Second 
Circuit and simultaneously published Blatchford’s Cir-
cuit Court Reports between 1852 and 1888. See Hector 
T. Fenton, Mr. Justice Blatchford. In Memoriam, 41 Am. 
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L. Reg. 882, 882-83 (1893). And in this capacity, he pro-
duced the report for the leading New York decision on 
the copyrightability of judicial opinions, Little v. Gould, 
15 F. Cas. 604, 612 n.1 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (“Reported 
by Samuel Blatchford, Esq., and here reprinted by per-
mission.”). 
 At issue in Little was a New York statute that for-
bade any assertions of copyright in the judicial deci-
sions of the court of appeals, and further vested the 
copyright in “any notes or references made by the 
state reporter” in the state, for public benefit. Id. at 
608. The question in the case revolved around under-
standing what these “notes and references” could be 
and whether it encompassed content produced by a 
court reporter entirely gratuitously, and without obli-
gation. The court in Little answered this question in 
the negative, concluding that the phrase “notes and 
references” was limited to those portions of the reports 
“constituting an essential ingredient of their integral 
composition, and which the state reporter, as such, was 
therefore bound to supply.” Id. at 609. These included 
the “summary of the points decided by the court,” “the 
footnotes” therein, and the summary of the parties’ ar-
guments—all prepared by the court reporter. Id. Out-
side of this phrase were the “abstracts of the pleadings 
and statements of facts,” which formed the basis of the 
opinions themselves and anything else that the re-
porter included. Id. at 610. 
 While Little was based on a state statute, the 
court’s attempt to differentiate between the copyright-
able and uncopyrightable parts of a reporter’s work 
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was driven entirely by the official function of the court 
reporter. Nowhere does the court tie the copyrightabil-
ity of a part of the report, or indeed its lack thereof, to 
the question of whether that part is binding. Gratui-
tously, as opposed to obligatorily, produced elements of 
the court report were copyrightable by the court re-
porter because they were in no sense part of the opin-
ion, nor of the “notes and references” accompanying it. 
 The demarcation at issue in Little formed the ba-
sis of Justice Blatchford’s reasoning in Callaghan, al-
lowing the copyrightability of those parts of the reports 
prepared entirely by a court reporter. This influence is 
borne out in the Callaghan opinion’s reference to the 
“absence of a prohibitory statute” which was being in-
terpreted in Little. See Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647. 
Without such a prohibition, all elements of a case re-
port produced by a court reporter are rendered copy-
rightable, including those generated in the exercise of 
the reporter’s official functions. Nothing whatsoever 
turns on whether the elements are binding and have 
the force of law as such. 
 Petitioner’s argument about the need for an edict 
of government to have the “force of law” is therefore 
clearly contradicted by the reasoning in Banks and 
Manchester. Consequently, the mere fact that the an-
notations merged into the O.C.G.A. lack the force of 
law has no bearing whatsoever on the conclusion that 
the O.C.G.A. as a whole constitutes an uncopyrightable 
edict of government. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477564 
19 
 
B. Annotations Produced under the Osten-
sible Authority of the State Qualify as 
Edicts of Government 
 While the annotations merged into the O.C.G.A. 
are declared by the terms of the O.C.G.A. to lack the 
force of law, they are nevertheless merged into the stat-
ute through a formal vote of the Georgia legislature. 
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1. Petitioners argue that this vote and 
adoption is functionally meaningless in relation to the 
edicts of government doctrine since the annotations 
were not individually voted on, and thus never go 
through the formal legislative process. Pet. Br. at 40. 
While the process does not convert the annotations 
into law, it nonetheless implicates the edicts of govern-
ment doctrine, which applies to all annotations and 
statements of law produced under the ostensible au-
thority of the state. 
 In its brief, the United States clearly recognizes 
the flaw in Petitioners’ argument that a work must 
have the “force of law” to qualify as an edict of govern-
ment. U.S. Br. at 24 n.6. In its place, it suggests an al-
ternative formulation: to qualify as a government 
edict, the expression at issue must have been prepared 
by the individual in “his capacity as a lawmaker.” Id. 
at 21. The United States further suggests adopting an 
expansive framework encompassing the “whole work” 
of the individual in order to make this determination, 
thereby covering not just a legislator’s immediate ac-
tions in voting to pass a bill, but also “materials pro-
duced as a legislator discharging his lawmaking 
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duties.” Id. While this approach fares better than Peti-
tioners’ argument, it too is fraught with difficulties. 
 The government’s test effectively boils down to 
determining whether the expression at issue was pro-
duced in a lawmaking capacity. In illustrating the 
working of the test, the government chooses easy ex-
amples. Id. at 21. In applying its test to the O.C.G.A., 
the government nevertheless concludes that the 
O.C.G.A. was not produced by the legislature in a law-
making capacity because of differences between the 
process through which the O.C.G.A. is formally 
adopted and the process of enacting legislation in 
Georgia. Id. at 23-31. 
 Indeed, the government’s application of its own 
test to the O.C.G.A. illustrates the problems with its 
test. While the process through which the O.C.G.A. is 
voted on, adopted as official, and merged into the rest 
of the statute may be formally distinct from the state’s 
standard legislative process, the difference is meaning-
less to readers and users of the O.C.G.A. attempting to 
determine the relevant statutory rule of the state, and 
reproduce it if and when needed. To users of the 
O.C.G.A., the work on its face bears the imprimatur of 
the state, epitomized in the annotations being con-
tained in a volume captioned “Official.” 
 To have ordinary citizens distinguish between the 
legislature’s different processes in assessing the copy-
rightability of an edict would impose an undue hard-
ship on the public and users of the law. This is 
especially the case given the absence of any common 
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understanding of “lawmaking capacity,” as assumed by 
the government. The question of copyrightability (of a 
government edict) would now come to be tied to an 
awareness of the lawmaking body’s different proce-
dures, and the differential effects of those procedures 
on the product coming out of that body. The govern-
ment’s proposed test is therefore unworkable in prac-
tice. 
 Respondent recognizes the deficiencies in both Pe-
titioners’ and the government’s tests and in its place 
offers an alternative: to qualify as an edict of govern-
ment, the work must be prepared in the exercise of 
“state legal authority.” Resp. Br. at 17, 22. Respondent’s 
test represents a workable formulation in large part, 
but it can be read as requiring the exercise of actual 
legal authority granted to the creator of the edict by 
the state. In this reading, once again the informational 
burden on users of the edict would be high, who would 
have to now investigate the scope and extent of such 
authority. 
 A minor modification to Respondent’s proposed 
rule represents a fully workable alternative and is 
compatible with the precedents at hand: edicts of gov-
ernment are prepared in the exercise of ostensible au-
thority of the state. In situations where an edict holds 
itself out as having been created under the authority 
of the state, regardless of whether it was actually pro-
duced under the authority of the state, it qualifies as 
an uncopyrightable edict of government. This rule 
would cover both situations where there is actual au-
thority, as well as those where such formal authority is 
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lacking but the state nevertheless acquiesces in the 
work representing itself as having the imprimatur of 
the state, as is the case with the O.C.G.A. 
 Both Banks and Callaghan are consistent with 
this approach. As evidenced by the language of the 
Court in Callaghan, the work of the reporter was read-
ily identifiable in case reports and understood widely 
to carry no authority of the state. Callaghan, 128 U.S. 
at 645 (referring to the “usual form” of law reports). It 
was only in the rare case that judges—carrying the au-
thority of the state—produced parts of the report other 
than the opinions, which altered this understanding 
and rendered the work uncopyrightable as an edict. 
See, e.g., Banks, 128 U.S. at 251. 
 Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898) was the 
first case extending the edicts of government doctrine 
to statutes and is also consistent with this understand-
ing. The case involved an annotated compilation of 
Michigan state statutes prepared by the plaintiff, How-
ell. Id. at 130. Shortly after its compilation, the state 
legislature passed a law declaring that “the general 
laws of the state, as collected and arranged in those 
volumes, should be received and admitted in all courts 
and proceedings, and by all officers, ‘as evidence of the 
existing laws thereof, with like effect as if published 
under and by the authority of the state.’ ” Id. at 131. As 
Respondent notes in its brief, the legislature merely is-
sued its imprimatur to the general laws of the state 
contained in the plaintiff ’s compilations, and not to 
everything contained therein, including the additional 
material prepared by the plaintiff. Resp. Br. at 34-35. 
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The court concluded that the plaintiff ’s annotations 
were copyrightable works, even though the statutory 
component of the compilation was an uncopyrightable 
government edict. See Howell, 91 F. at 138. 
 On the facts of Howell, the state legislature was 
circumspect to only authenticate the “general laws” as 
“collected and arranged” by the plaintiff, even though 
it noted that the book contained those laws “compiled 
and annotated.” 2 HOWELL’S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF 
MICHIGAN iv (1883). The state, in other words, con-
sciously disavowed authenticating the plaintiff ’s anno-
tations. Neither the state of Michigan, nor Howell, 
therefore held out the annotations as ever garnering 
the imprimatur of the state. Indeed, Howell accurately 
reproduced the exact wording of the authenticating 
statute in his volume, thereby effectively avoiding the 
possibility of any exercise of ostensible authority. 
 The annotations in the O.C.G.A., by contrast, do 
just the opposite. They hold themselves out as having 
obtained the endorsement of the state legislature, even 
while disclaiming any binding status as law. In so do-
ing, they should be treated as uncopyrightable. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
affirmed. 
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